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We analyse the question of optimal taxation in a dual economy, when the govern-
ment is concerned about the distribution of labour income. Income inequality is
caused by the presence of sunk capital investments, which creates a ’good jobs’
sector due to the capture of quasi-rents by trade unions. We ﬁnd that whether
the government should subsidise or tax investments is crucially dependent on
union bargaining strength. If unions are weak, the optimal tax policy implies a
combination of investment taxes and progressive income taxation. On the other
hand, if unions are strong, we ﬁnd that the best option for the government is
to use investment subsidies in combination with either progressive or propor-
tional taxation, the latter being the optimal policy if the government is not
too concerned about inequality and if the cost of income taxation is suﬃciently
high.
Keywords: rent sharing, segmented labour markets, optimal taxation, redis-
tribution.
JEL classiﬁcation: H2, J42, J511I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper concerns itself with redistribution policy speciﬁcally and optimal
taxation more generally in a dual labour market setting. We portray the econ-
omy as divided in a primary ’good jobs’ sector and a secondary sector with
’bad jobs’. The good jobs sector is characterised by sunk capital investments
and by the fact that labour, by forming a trade union or otherwise, manages
to capture parts of the quasi-rents that are generated. The good jobs sector is
’good’ because wages are higher there, and all workers would prefer a good job
if they could only get one. In turn, the fact that labour captures quasi-rents will
typically lead to underinvestment and a too small primary sector, as in Grout
(1984) and Manning (1987).
There are several options available for a government that cares about dis-
tribution. Should the government try to tax away some of the income of the
primary sector workers and redistribute towards secondary sector ones? Should
the government instead seek to tax away the quasi-rent from the primary sector
directly through an investment tax? Or by using a proﬁt tax? Or should the
government try to expand the primary sector by subsidising investment, so that
more workers can enjoy high primary sector wages? The attempt to disentangle
questions as these is the core contents of the current work.
The literature on optimal redistributive taxation (e.g. Dixit and Sandmo
(1977), Sandmo (1983, 1998) and Parker (1999)) discusses redistribution in a
setting with competitive labour markets. Here a high income is typically the
result of high ability, the relevant trade-oﬀ is between more redistribution and
distorted labour supply incentives. As Sandmo (1998) stresses, without distri-
butional concerns it is diﬃcult even to give a welfare-theoretic justiﬁcation for
the use of distortive income taxation, as uniform lump-sum taxes then could be
used.
There is also a comparatively large literature on trade unions, wage bargain-
ing and taxation. Some early papers are Oswald (1982), Layard (1982), Her-
soug (1984), Malcolmson and Sartor (1987), Lockwood (1990) and Lockwood
and Manning (1993). A key focus in some of these papers is on the incidence
of taxation and none of them consider redistribution in a setting with trade
unions only in the primary sector. The only paper on unions and taxation we
know of that uses a two-sector framework is Holmlund and Lundborg (1990).
They study the incidence of diﬀerent ways of ﬁnancing unemployment beneﬁts
in a Harris-Todaro type framework.1 A related paper with rent-sharing in a
dual labour market is Agell and Lommerud (1997); Acemoglu (2001) develops
a model along similar lines. These papers focus on minimum wage legislation,
and optimal taxation is not an issue.
Of related interest is the empirical literature on labour rent sharing more
speciﬁcally and ﬁrm and industry wage diﬀerentials more generally. Some rele-
vant studies from various countries (mostly the US and the UK) are Rose (1987),
Murphy and Topel (1987), Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1988), Katz and Summers
(1989), Abowd and Lemieux (1993), Blanchﬂower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996),
Van Reenen (1996), Hildreth and Oswald (1997), Abowd (1998), and Margolis
and Salvanes (2001). Several of these studies support the notion that labour
1Also the framework we use has links to Harris-Todaro’s (1970) model of two-sector devel-
oping economies, although our focus is not on wait unemployment. Calvo (1978) introduced
primary sector trade unions into the Harris-Todaro model.
1shares in rents even in countries as the US where unions tend to be weak, but
contrasting views are also aired.
We will now sketch the main ﬁndings of the paper. If trade unions are
strong and a planner’s preference for equality is high, it turns out to be the best
policy to combine progressive income taxation and investment subsidies. In the
choice between trying to transfer money from primary to secondary workers
and seeking to expand the number of primary sector jobs, one chooses both.
If trade unions still are strong, but the preference for redistribution is weaker,
one will choose only to try to expand the good-jobs sector. We ﬁnd that if
income taxation becomes more costly, this will expand the parameter space
when the only policy used is to get more people into primary sector jobs while
the parameter space where this policy is used in conjunction with progressive
taxation contracts.
Moreover, if trade unions are not very strong, the investment subsidy policy
will be abandoned to the beneﬁt of an investment tax. Expanding the primary
sector now mostly beneﬁts capitalists (that by assumption do not count in the
welfare function), which cools the desire for investment subsidies. Instead, the
government seeks to capture those rents that the union could not by taxing in-
vestment. The investment tax is supplemented by progressive income taxation.
This result, that as mentioned apply for low values of the union’s ability to cap-
ture rent, is only to a minor degree inﬂuenced by the strength of the planner’s
preference for redistribution from primary to secondary workers.
Finally, we assume that a tax on pure proﬁts is possible up to an exogenously
given capped level. If the possibility of proﬁt taxation goes up, this contracts the
parameter space with investment taxation, basically because another instrument
to redistribute from capitalists to workers now becomes available.
2M o d e l
There are two sectors in the economy; a capital-intensive ’primary sector’ and a
labour intensive ’secondary sector’. As a simpliﬁcation we assume that primary
sector production necessitate the use of both labour and capital, whereas self-
employed labour is the only factor of production in the secondary sector.
By forming a trade union, workers in the primary sector are able to capture
a share of the rents generated by sunk capital investments. This is the key
assumption of the model.
There are two periods in our model. In the ﬁrst period primary sector
investments, K, are sunk. For simplicity we assume a ﬁxed relationship between
employment and capital in the primary sector. Thus, employment is indirectly





where γ is a measure of the degree of capital intensity in production.
Production takes place in the second period. Workers are initially identical,
and sorting to the sectors is assumed to be arbitrary. The wage rate in the
primary sector, w1, is determined through ex-post bargaining between the union
and the ﬁrm(s). In the secondary sector, labour is used in a constant-returns-
2to-scale process and the workers in this sector earn w2. All workers, in both
sectors, supply one unit of labour inelastically.
2.1 Wage bargaining
Since employment is determined prior to bargaining, primary sector workers are
only concerned about maximising wages. We assume that the number of hours
to be worked in the primary sector is ﬁxed by the employers before bargaining.2
Assuming a linear revenue function, with the marginal revenue of capital
given by φ, the second period proﬁt of a representative employer is
π = φK − w1L (2)
We assume Nash bargaining and let the relative bargaining strength of the
trade union be denoted by α ∈ [0,1]. Primary sector workers can always obtain
w2, so this is taken to be the threat-point of the union. The threat-point of
the ﬁrm is zero. Let t ∈ [0,1] be the marginal tax rate on labour income. The
primary sector wage rate is given by the solution to the following problem:
max
w1
αln{(w1 − w2)(1− t)} +( 1− α)ln{φK − w1L}
which yields
w1 = w2 + α(φγ − w2) (3)
and
π =( 1− α)(φK − w2L) (4)
The bargained wage is given by the fall-back wage and a share in the higher
productivity of labour in the primary sector, φγ − w2.
Obviously, we have to assume that φγ >w 2. Note that pre-tax wages do
not depend on tax rates. This result depends on the linearity assumptions of
the model and means that we bypass a discussion of questions of incidence.
Normalising the size of the total labour force to 1, the average pre-tax labour
income in the economy is given by
w = Lw1 +( 1− L)w2 (5)
2.2 Capital investments
Abstracting from discounting, the ﬁrst-period problem facing the ﬁrm is to
choose the level of investments that maximises present-value proﬁts, given by
Π = π − C (K,s) (6)
The cost of investment depends on the amount of capital acquired and the




K2 − sK (7)
2If employers and unions had bargained over an hourly wage and then let workers choose
their desired work eﬀort, we would have oversupply of labour eﬀort. Working more would for
each individual worker be a way of securing more rents for himself.
3Using (1), (3) and (4) we ﬁnd that the optimal investment level is given by







Using (1), (4), (6) and (7) we also ﬁnd that




Without unionisation, the ﬁrm would be able to hire workers at the wage
w2. In this case it is easily shown that the optimal investment level is given by




Thus, we see from (8) that in the absence of investment subsidies, the presence
of unions always leads to under-investment, as long as the union has some
bargaining power.
2.3 Government
In designing an optimal tax scheme the government is assumed to have three
diﬀerent policy instruments at its disposal; a proportional income tax rate (t), a
uniform lump-sum transfer to all workers (b) and a capital investment subsidy
(s). Whereas b is assumed to be non-negative, s is allowed also to take on
negative values, making it then a tax on investments.
As we will return to later, we also assume that there is proﬁt taxation in the
economy, but that this rate is capped at an exogenous level, τ.
2.3.1 Welfare
A key assumption is that the government puts more weight on the income of
the working population than on the proﬁts of capital owners. We capture this
feature in a simple manner by assuming that proﬁts do not enter the welfare
function at all. Furthermore, we assume that the government is not only con-
cerned about total labour income, but also about the distribution of income
across the working population. A relatively simple welfare function that has
the required properties is3
W = e w(1 − βG) (11)
where
e w = w(1 − t)+b
is average post-tax labour income. G ∈ [0,1] is the Gini coeﬃcient, a stan-
dard measure of income inequality. A more equal distribution of income would
3The welfare function is non-welfarist in the sense that it does not build on individual utility
functions and arbitrary assumptions about cardinal properties of these functions. The present
function has also tractability advantages in the current context. A social welfare function of
this kind is suggested by Lambert (1993). Using survey data, Amiel et al (1999) ﬁnd that this
functional form generally gives a better ﬁt to individuals’ attitudes towards inequality than
more traditional forms based on constant relative or constant absolute inequality aversion.
4imply a lower value of G. The parameter β ∈ [0,1) is thus a measure of the
government’s aversion towards income inequality.4
In our model, the Gini coeﬃcient is given by5
G =
L(1 − L)(w1 − w2)(1− t)
e w
(12)
If the government wants to decrease income inequality, there are several options




L(1 − L)(w1 − w2)b





L(1 − L)(w1 − w2)(1− t)
e w2 < 0
Thus, an increase in t or an increase in b will both contribute towards a more
equal distribution of labour income.
Another, and less obvious, option for the government is to alter the relative
share of ’good jobs’ in the economy, for instance by subsidising capital invest-
ments. Let b wi be post-tax labour income per worker in sector i. An expansion
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We see that a marginal expansion of the primary sector has an ambiguous










This is always true if L>1
2. Thus, expanding the primary sector contributes to
a more equal income distribution if more than half of the working population is
already situated in this sector, or if the diﬀerence in post-tax income between
t h es e c t o r si ss u ﬃciently high. Expanding the good-jobs sector can be good or
bad for income distribution as measured by the Gini coeﬃcient: For illustration
assume that all workers work in bad jobs, giving a good job to only one worker
then makes the income distribution more uneven. If all but one worker have
good jobs, moving this last worker to the primary sector obviously evens out
the income distribution.
Inserting the expression for G into the welfare function, we obtain
W =( 1− t)[w − βL(1 − L)(w1 − w2)] + b (13)
We can see how a marginal change in the relative sizes of the two sectors
aﬀects welfare by considering the following partial derivatives:
∂W
∂L
=(b w1 − b w2)[(1− β)+β2L] > 0
4The assumption that β < 1 not only ensures that welfare always is positive, but makes
further sure that the welfare function is Paretian in that it obeys the Pareto criterion. We
show below that moving a worker from the bad-jobs to the good-jobs sector always improves
welfare, and it can also be shown that increasing the primary sector wage, ceteris paribus,
increases welfare.
5See Appendix A for an explicit derivation of the Gini coeﬃcient.
5∂2W
∂L∂β
=(b w1 − b w2)(2L − 1) > (<)0 if L > (<)
1
2
A marginal expansion of the primary sector may not necessarily always make
income distribution more even, but it will always increase welfare. Even if the
distribution should become more skewed, the eﬀect of the increased average will
dominate. Had this not been the case, our welfare function would have been
non-Paretian. Furthermore, if the primary sector is larger than the secondary
sector initially, the welfare gain of a further expansion will be larger the more
w e i g h tt h eg o v e r n m e n tp u t so ni n c o m ee q u a l i t y .T h ec o n v e r s ew i l lb et h ec a s e
if L<1
2 initially.
To sum up this discussion, expanding the primary sector is ’redistribution
policy’ at least in the imprecise sense that some previously disadvantaged work-
ers beneﬁt from the policy. If ’redistribution policy’ is given the sharper meaning
to decrease a spread measure of incomes as the Gini coeﬃcient, we see that pri-
mary sector expansion is a rather blunt instrument to achieve this goal. Such
expansion does only contribute to redistribution in this more narrow sense when
the primary sector is ’large’ to begin with.
2.3.2 Budget
In order to avoid trivial solutions we must introduce impediments to the use
of tax instruments. We make the standard assumption that income taxation is
costly, and that the marginal cost of taxation is increasing. Technically, this
cost is incorporated in a very simple way by assuming that for every extra tax
dollar levied on the working population, the government receives 1−λt in extra
tax revenues, where λ ∈ [0,1].
In addition to labour income taxes, there is also a proportional tax on the
present value of proﬁt s . H o w e v e r ,w ea s s u m et h a tﬁrms can evade this tax
whenever the proﬁt tax rate exceeds some exogenously given level. This feature
is captured in the simplest possible way by assuming an exogenous proﬁtt a x
rate τ ∈ [0,1]. The two parameters λ and τ represent the limits to taxation:
Without them, tax authorities could simply collect all income in society and
redistribute after their own liking.
With these assumptions, the government budget is given by







tw − b − sK (14)
3 Optimal taxation
The optimal tax package is a vector (t∗,b ∗,s ∗) that solves the following problem
max
t,b,s
W (t,b,s;β,γ,α,φ,w 2) s.t. B (t,b,s;τ,λ,γ,α,φ,w 2) ≥ 0
Before turning to a partly graphical discussion of optimal taxation, some insights
into the mechanisms of the model can be obtained by inspection of the ﬁrst-
order conditions of the problem. Assuming that the side constraint holds with
equality, we can solve it for b and insert into the maximand, thereby eliminating
o n ec h o i c ev a r i a b l e .




+ βL(1 − L)(w1 − w2)=w (15)


































The left hand side of (15) is the marginal social beneﬁt of income taxation.
The ﬁrst term is the increase in government revenue, whereas the second term
is the beneﬁt from a more equal distribution of income. We see that the magni-
tude of this second term is dependent on the degree of inequality aversion, the
wage gap between the sectors, and the relative size of the primary sector. The
more equal the sectors are in terms of employment, the higher is the eﬀect of
increased income taxation on reducing income inequality, as measured by the
Gini coeﬃcient.
The right hand side of (15) is the marginal social cost of income taxation,
which is the average pre-tax wage. An important observation is that if β >
0, the marginal beneﬁt of income taxation always exceeds the social costs at
t =0 . There is no eﬃciency loss associated by collecting the ﬁrst income tax
dollar, and by handing out this dollar in equal portions to the entire working
population, social welfare is increased. Since complete equalisation of income is
only obtained at t =1 ,t h i sm u s tb et r u ei r r e s p e c t i v eo ft h es i z e so fs and b.
Thus, corner solutions with t∗ =0can be ruled out.
Now turning to the ﬁrst-order condition for the investment subsidy (tax).
If s>0, the left hand side of (16) can be interpreted as the marginal social
beneﬁt of investment subsidies. The primary social beneﬁt of increasing the
investment subsidy is a higher average wage, due to the fact that a larger share
of the working population is allowed into the ’good’ sector. The magnitude
of this beneﬁt is determined by the initial wage gap between the sectors. As
already noted and which also as can be seen from (16), if L>1
2 initially, an
inﬂux of workers into the primary sector contributes towards decreasing income
inequality.
The right hand side of (16) can be interpreted as the marginal social costs of
investment subsidies. Looking at (18), the last term in the square brackets are
the direct costs of a marginal increase in s. These costs are mitigated, however,
by an increase in tax revenue when the primary sector is expanded. Of course
if s<0, the interpretation of (16) is reversed.
We can use the above analysis to identify the diﬀerent tax regimes in the
model. We know that t∗ =0cannot be a solution as long as β > 0.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
from the budget constraint we know that b∗ =0must imply s∗ > 0.T h i sl e a v e s
us with three possible regimes:
Regime I: Progressive income taxation and investment subsidies (b∗ > 0,
s∗ > 0)
7Regime II: Proportional income taxation and investment subsidies (b∗ =0 ,
s∗ > 0)
Regime III: Progressive income taxation and an investment tax (b∗ > 0,
s∗ ≤ 0)
Optimal taxation in the present economy concerns basically two issues: The
planner has a taste for redistribution and there is also an underinvestment prob-
lem due to the fact that labour captures parts of quasi-rents. Regime I then
seems to be a natural choice, one uses progressive taxation for redistribution
purposes and investment subsidies to expand the primary sector (which also
can have beneﬁcial distributional eﬀects). However, it is possible (regime II)
that all proceeds from the income tax is used on investment subsidies (and not
on a lump-sum grant to all workers). It can also be (regime III) that one uses
the capital investment in the primary sector as a tax base, knowing that this
aggravates the underinvestment problem, in order to pay out higher lump-sum
grants to the working population. The central question in the remainder of the
paper is when which strategy is chosen. The central parameters of the model
are labour’s rent share (α), the planner’s taste for redistribution (β), and the
two measures of impediments to taxation, the income tax collection cost para-
meter (λ) and the cap on proﬁt taxation (τ). The full analytical solution turns
out to be rather messy. Instead of performing standard comparative statics
experiments, our main strategy will be to ﬁx two of these variables (the tax im-
pediment variables) at various given levels, and then illustrate graphically how
combinations in α and β leads optimal policy to lie in one of the three possible
regimes. Before we do this, however, we will study two special cases that we
think shed some light on the workings of the model, namely the cases where
income taxation is costless, λ =0and when the planner has no redistribution
preference, β =0 .
At this point, we make some rather innocent simpliﬁcations, by setting φ =1 ,
γ =1and w2 =0 .T h e s es i m p l i ﬁcations preserve all the important mechanisms
of the model. Furthermore, in order to secure an optimal solution for the entire
set of parameter values we will assume that the exogenous proﬁtt a xr a t e ,τ,i s
not too high.6
With these simpliﬁcations, the optimal taxation problem is reduced to
max
s,t,b
W =( 1− t)w[1 − β (1 − L)] + b (19)
subject to







tw − b − sL ≥ 0 (20)
As forewarned, we start out by considering two ’polar’ cases, one in which
income redistribution is costless and one in which the policy maker has no
preference for such redistribution.
3.1 Costless income taxation (λ =0 )
If income taxation is costless, then income redistribution is also costless. We
assume that the government is concerned about income distribution at least to
6It can be shown that when substituting for b in the welfare function, concavity of the
maximand requires that τ ≤ 2(1− αβ (1 − t)) − αλ(1 − α + s).
8some small degree (β > 0). It can costlessly achieve complete equality by setting
t =1 .S e t t i n gλ =0and t =1 , the problem is reduced to
max





(1 − α + s)(2(α − s)+τ (1 − α + s))
The ﬁrst thing to note is that β is eliminated from the problem. This is very
intuitive. The trade-oﬀ between income redistribution and income maximisation
for the whole working population is only present when redistribution is costly.
Otherwise, the optimal policy for the government is to collect all labour income,
and hand it out as lump-sum transfers. Thus, the optimal value of s is the one







2α + τ (1 − α) − 1
2 − τ
(23)
We see that b∗ |λ=0> 0, so the optimal tax regime is either I or III, depending
on the parameter values.











Ah i g h e rp r o ﬁt tax rate, or stronger unions, increases the optimal value of s∗.
There are three potential sources of tax revenue from the primary sector: Income
taxation, investment taxation and proﬁt taxation. Increasing the investment tax
(or reducing the subsidies) yields direct revenues for the government, but the
resulting contraction of the primary sector means that revenues from income
and proﬁt taxation are reduced. If unions are strong, and thus primary sector
wages are high, an expansion of the primary sector would yield a large increase
i nt a xr e v e n u e s .T h es a m ei st r u ei ft h ep r o ﬁt tax rate is high. Consequently,
it is optimal for the government to subsidise capital investments if the relative
bargaining strength of the unions, or the proﬁtt a xr a t e ,i ss u ﬃciently high.
>>From (23) we also ﬁnd that
s∗ |λ=0> (<)0 if α > (<)
1 − τ
2 − τ
At one extreme, if τ =0 ,t h e ns∗ |λ=0= α − 1
2.T h u s ,w i t h o u tp r o ﬁt taxation,
the optimal tax policy implies investment subsidies (taxes) if α > (<) 1
2.S t r o n g
unions mean that investment subsidies so-to-speak will be recouped through
high, taxable primary sector wages. Absent proﬁt taxation, high, taxable pimary
sector wages is the only remaining way investment subsidies can be ”recouped”.
9At the other extreme, if τ =1 ,t h e ns∗ |λ=0= α,w h i c hi st h eﬁrst-best level of
subsidies, from an eﬃciency point of view.7 Under the assumption that proﬁtt o
capital owners has no value for the social planner, any proﬁtt a xr a t eb e l o wt h e
conﬁscatory level means that some part of capital revenues are wasted, from the
planner’s point of view, and thus the optimal subsidy rate implies investment
below the ﬁrst-best level.
3.2 No inequality aversion (β =0 )
If the government is not concerned about income distribution among workers,
the tax parameters are optimally set so that average labour income is maximised.
Setting β =0we ﬁnd the optimal solution to be given by
b∗ |β=0=
½ 1−2α
2(2−τ) if α ≤ 1
2



























ψ =4 α − 8αλ + αλ2 +6 λ
When income inequality is not an issue for the government, the income tax
parameter t is only used when it is necessary to ﬁnance investment subsidies,
so t∗ |β=0> 0 only if α > 1
2.L i k ei nt h ec a s ew i t hλ =0 , there is no trade-oﬀ
between income redistribution and income maximisation, so the government’s
problem is reduced to setting the tax parameters in a way that maximises av-
erage after-tax income.
>From (26) we ﬁnd that s∗ |β=0< 0 if α < 1−τ
2−τ. Consequently, there are
three possible tax regimes:
If α < 1−τ
2−τ , there is a tax on investments, and the revenues from this







, there are investment subsidies, and these are fully ﬁnanced
by revenues from the proﬁt tax, which also cover the lump-sum transfer. If
α > 1
2, the optimal policy also imply investment subsidies, but these are now
jointly ﬁnanced by proﬁt and income taxation, and there are no lump-sum
transfers.Again, we see that labor’s bargaining strenth is important for whether
investment should be taxed or subsidised.
3.3 Inequality aversion and costly income taxation (λ > 0
and β > 0)
Now to the more general case when the government cares about inequality,
and income taxation is costly. The optimal solution is determined by four
7For this special case we do not need any assumption that caps the proﬁtt a xa tal e v e l
strictly below one.
10parameters: α, β, λ and τ. The explicit solutions, which are rather messy, are
reported in Appendix B.
We know from the previous analysis that there are three possible tax regimes,
where Regime II is a corner solution with b∗ =0 . Furthermore, Regime I also
contains a possible corner solution with t =1 . If the cost of income taxation is
suﬃciently low, combined with a certain degree of inequality aversion, we know
that the government will set the income tax at the conﬁscatory level.
The three possible tax regimes are most easily characterised graphically. In
Figures 1-3 we have plotted b∗ =0and s∗ =0for ﬁxed values of the limits-
to-taxation variables τ and λ, to illustrate how diﬀerent combinations of α and
β determine the optimal tax regime. Using Figure 1 as a benchmark, Figure
2s h o w st h ee ﬀect of more costly income taxation, whereas Figure 3 shows the
eﬀect of a higher proﬁtt a xr a t e .
We see that whether the government should subsidise or tax capital invest-
ments (the choice between regimes I or II on the one side and regime III on the
other) is primarily dependent on the relative bargaining strength of the trade
unions. If unions are strong, then the wage gap between the sectors are large,
and an expansion of the primary sector will have a pronounced eﬀect on both
the average wage and income tax revenues. Consequently, the optimal policy
implies investment subsidies. Conversely, if the unions are weak, the major share
of the revenues created by investment subsidies will go to the capital owners, so
the government would do better by taxing investments.
An increase in the degree of inequality aversion, β, implies a slight expan-
sion of Regime III. If the government has very strong preferences for income
redistribution, it is important to raise suﬃcient revenue for this purpose. A tax
on investment is thus a somewhat more likely outcome. The main eﬀect of a
reduction in β is that it makes it less likely that progressive taxation is used in
conjunction with investment subsidies.
Regarding within-regime eﬀects of β, it can also be shown that the degree
of inequality aversion is primarily determinant for the degree of income tax
progressivity, and only to a minor degree does β inﬂuence the optimal size of the
investment subsidy (tax). One possible interpretation could be that industrial
policy of the kind we are considering is a relatively poor instrument for achieving
income redistribution, compared to using income tax parameters. In our model,
the main eﬀect of industrial policy is to increase the average post-tax income
among workers.
The optimal tax policy implies proportional income taxation (Regime II) if
the unions are relatively strong, and the degree of inequality aversion is relatively
low. This is also quite intuitive. We know that b∗ =0only when investments
are subsidised, and this will be the case when unions are suﬃciently strong. The
primary beneﬁt of using tax revenues to subsidise investments is an increase in
the average wage. On the other hand, the purpose of progressive taxation is in-
come redistribution, and the beneﬁt of redistribution is determined by β.W h e n
β is relatively low, it is more beneﬁcial for the government to use all tax rev-
enues to increase the average wage, by subsidising primary sector investments.
Consequently, the optimal policy implies b∗ =0if α is suﬃciently high and β
is suﬃciently low.
An increase in the proﬁtt a xr a t e ,τ, implies a contraction of Regime III. This
is very intuitive. The cost of investment taxation is the (indirect) loss of tax
revenue when the primary sector contracts. Consequently, a higher proﬁtt a x
11Figure 1: Optimal tax regimes when τ =0and λ = 1
2.
Figure 2: Optimal tax regimes when τ =0and λ =1 .
Figure 3: Optimal tax regimes when τ = 1
4 and λ = 1
2.
12rate means that this cost increases. The ﬂip side of the coin of this argument is
that when investment is subsidised, a high proﬁt tax means that the subsidy is
partly retrieved through proﬁt taxation, which obviously makes subsidies more
attractive.
We also see that an increase in λ implies an expansion of Regime II. When
the cost of income taxation increases, the optimal income tax rate goes down.
Thus, less tax revenue is generated, and, since the marginal beneﬁto fi n v e s t m e n t
subsidies is decreasing, a larger share of the tax revenues is spent on subsidising
the primary sector. Consequently, b∗ =0for a larger set of parameter values.
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The purpose of this paper has been to examine optimal taxation issues in a
dual economy, where labour shares in rents in a primary sector but not in the
other, secondary sector of the economy. Labour rent sharing at the same time
introduces an underinvestment problem in the primary sector and distributional
issues within the working population. How should a benevolent planner tackle
this?
Assume that we are in a situation with strong unions and a high planner
preference for income equality. Optimal policy is then to use progressive tax-
ation and investment subsidies in conjunction. A pure proﬁtt a xw i l lb eu s e d
to the extent this is possible, and a high proﬁt tax points at more investment
subsidies, as the subsidy cost then to a high degree is retrieved by the proﬁt
tax. This policy package is not dissimilar to actual policies used for example
in Scandinavia in the ﬁrst decades following World War II, and these countries
were arguably marked by strong unions and a preference for equality. ’Pro-
gressive taxation’ here means to tax away money from relatively high earning
unionised workers to the less fortunate, so the welfare state system should in-
deed by seen as part of this ’progressivity’. Both redistributive taxation and
active industrial policy have often been criticised as costly deviations from an
eﬃcient economy, but here we have argued that a package of these policies can
be the optimal response to labour rent sharing, a package that partly is meant
to restore eﬃciency.
The above package of policies is not optimal in all settings, however. Assume
for example that unions are weakened. Rent-sharing is less important within
the rent-generating sector. We have then shown that the optimal policy package
is still to use progressive taxation, but now to tax rather than subsidise invest-
ments. Proﬁt taxation is still used to the extent that this is possible. We have
assumed that the planner only care for the income of the working population,
not for that of capital owners. With little rent-sharing, the motivation to restore
eﬃciency in the primary sector disappears: Unionised workers will nevertheless
be held down to something close to the competitive wage. A planner will rather
think of the primary sector as a tax base: He will try to capture parts of the
quasi-rents himself, on behalf of the working population, now that the union
is less able to do so. Unionised workers still earn more than the workers in
the ’bad jobs’ of the economy, so progressive taxation is still a relevant tool for
redistribution.
Another thing that might change from the starting point with strong unions
and a high preference for equality, is that the planner’s own preference against
13inequality within the working population might change. The planner is of course
merely an abstraction, so if the attitudes towards equality change in the soci-
ety, this should be reﬂected in the inequality aversion parameter that is used
for policy analysis. A change in attitudes on equality turns out mainly to be
important when unions are strong enough to make investment subsidies part of
the optimal policy package. Less weight on equality will make it more likely
that we combine investment subsidies with proportional rather than progressive
taxation. Tax revenue from the income tax has two competing uses: They can
be redistributed to the working population in a lump-sum manner or used to
subsidise investment. The less weight on equality considerations, the more likely
is the corner solution where all tax revenue is used to increase the size of the
primary sector rather than for lump-sum transfers.
Lastly we want to highlight what happens if the cost of collecting income
taxes changes. We have represented tax collection costs in a rather simple man-
ner, but we could argue outside the model that they are connected to the labour
supply responses of people not working in the rent-sharing sector. An increasing
cost of tax collection could therefore mean that rent-sharing is less important,
not because unions within the rent-sharing sector are weaker, but because the
rent-sharing sector has contracted in size relative to another sector where work-
ers earn much simply because they are highly productive. Then labour supply
issues will probably mean that the distortions created by income taxation be-
come more important. Crudely put, the economy might have developed from a
setting with rent-sharing unionised workers in heavy industries to a setting with
highly productive high-tech workers that are paid the value of their marginal
product. The cost of taxation might also have increased due to globalisation,
with more mobile workers.
While weaker unions implied moving from investment subsidies to invest-
ment taxes, a higher collection cost implies that the corner solution when in-
vestment subsidies are used in combination with proportional taxation becomes
more probable. With more expensive tax collection, there is less tax revenue
available. This should point to less redistribution and less investment subsi-
dies. But why should this mean that it is more likely that we are in a corner
solution where only investment subsidies and not lump-sum redistribution is
chosen? The basic reason is that the marginal beneﬁt of investment is decreas-
ing, so with contracting tax revenues a larger share of these revenues is used
to subsidise investments. A fuller analysis should take into account that if the
reason that the collection cost has gone up is contraction of the rent-sharing
sector, then there is also probably less need for investment subsidies. In turn,
this might imply that progressive taxation might survive as part of the optimal
policy package even in a ’modernised’ economy.
By way of conclusion, it is interesting to discuss if the proposed policies
can be characterised as ’union busting through the tax system’? Take as an
example the situation with strong unions and strong preferences for equality.
The joint policy of investment subsidies and progressive taxation does of course
go some way towards undoing the actions of the unions. The primary sector
wage premium that the unions have secured is partly taken away and given
to less fortunate workers. The eﬃciency loss from unionisation is also partly
restored through the investment subsidy. In the long run, the incentives for
workers to form unions are weakened. This might very well be referred to as
union busting, if one chooses. The planner is assumed to care for the whole
14working population, though, so an alternative angle is to say that policy here
adjusts for the insider-outsider problem inherent in primary sector unionisation.
The interests of all workers of course cannot be worse represented when union
power is supplemented with the power to tax.
A Derivation of the Gini coeﬃcient
Let x ∈ [0,1] denote the proportion of the working population when workers
are ordered according to income, and let the function L(x) denote the share of
total income accruing to the share of the population given by x.S o ,f o ri n s t a n c e ,
L(0.3) is the share of total income accruing to the 30 per cent poorest of the
population. L(x) is commonly known as the Lorenz curve. In our model, with
only two types of workers, the Lorenz curve is a piece-wise linear function with




L(b w1−b w2)+b w2xi f 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 − L
−
(1−L)(b w1−b w2)
L(b w1−b w2)+b w2 + b w1
L(b w1−b w2)+b w2xi f1 − L<x≤ 1
(A.1)
where b wi is the post-tax income per worker in sector i. >From the Lorenz curve





Inserting the expression for L(x) from (A.1) into (A.2) and integrating, yields
G =
L(1 − L)(b w1 − b w2)
(Lb w1 +( 1− L) b w2)
(A.3)
Finally, substituting for b wi = wi (1 − t)+b yields
G =
L(1 − L)(w1 − w2)(1− t)
e w
(A.4)
where e w is the average post-tax income.
B Explicit expressions for the optimal solution




(1 − α + s)[tα(2 − tλ)+τ (1 − α) − s(2 − τ)]
Inserting this expression into the welfare function and maximising, yields the
following interior solution (i.e. Regime I and III) for the optimal tax parameters:
t∗ =






















η =4 τλ2βα− 4β2ατλ +4 β2α2λ2 − 4τλ2 +4 λ2 +2 β2αλ − 2β3α2λ
κ =5 τ2λ2 − 20τλ2 − 6βατλ+1 4 τλ2βα− 8β2ατλ +2 β4α2 +6 β2α2λ
−6β3α2 +2 β3α2λ +8 β2α2λ2 +1 2 βαλ+2 0 λ2 − 8β2αλ − 28βαλ2
ρ =2 βα, σ =( 2− τ)
There are two possible corner solutions. If the preference for income redis-
tribution is suﬃciently high, and if the cost of income taxation is suﬃciently
low, the optimal solution implies t∗ =1 .I nt h i sc a s ew eﬁnd that the optimal
values of s and b are given by
s∗ =








On the other hand, if the inequality aversion is suﬃciently low and the unions
are suﬃciently strong, the optimal solution implies b∗ =0 . Furthermore, from
the budget constraint we know that b∗ =0implies s∗ > 0,s ot h i sp a r t i c u l a r
corner solution uniquely determines Regime II.
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